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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the perceived need or lack of need for an active defense system 
afloat (e.g., the covert analysis detection [CAD] system) to protect shipboard networks 
from possible cyber-attacks. As hacking methods evolve, it is likely that nation-states and 
terrorists will attempt to interfere with or take control of shipboard systems remotely. 
This thesis builds on the work of previous NPS theses that suggest the Navy consider 
deploying a CAD system in the Aegis Combat System to secure better the system against 
potential cyber intrusions or attacks. This system could covertly detect intrusions of 
malicious programs and track their activities and behavior, deceive the malicious 
software, and/or isolate it to keep it from causing irreparable harm while deceiving the 
attacker with regard to system status. The data would only be available to the CO and 
designated shipboard personnel. In order to determine a need for such a system, 10 
current and former commanders afloat were surveyed. The overwhelming majority saw a 
need to defend ships from cyber-attacks. Most of them saw the benefit of a CAD system 
in the cyber defense of U.S. Navy warships. This thesis recommends the development of 
the CAD system for shipboard use. 
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A. THE NEED TO SECURE SHIP NETWORKS FROM CYBER ATTACKS 
The motivation behind this thesis is a combination of the reliance on information 
technology (IT) and a concern to ensure the security of shipboard weapons networks. As 
a surface warfare officer (SWO), the security of weapons systems is of keen interest to 
the author. Knowing that shipboard systems are protected from cyber-attacks and 
infiltration by enemies (e.g., [cyber] terrorists and state actors) is critical in projecting sea 
power. It is critical for a commanding officer (CO) and their tactical action officers 
(TAOs) to know that their weapons systems are secure and reliable at all times. 
In order to further the discussion, it was necessary go beyond the theories and to 
discuss with actual warfighters their firsthand experience in, knowledge of, and 
reflections on command. This information will provide a basis for future studies and 
potentially future cyber defense systems that will better insulate shipboard networks from 
cyber-attacks. This will draw on tactical knowledge that has developed over several 
careers at sea. This invaluable insight will help both to build upon the aforementioned 
writings and to develop future avenues for improving naval tactics to better defends ships 
at sea in the age of cyber. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will seek to identify current and potential threats to shipboard 
networks that need to be addressed by consulting current and former COs of United 
States Navy (USN) warships. The current and future threats identified will help to further 
ongoing and future research in the area of cyber sensitivities of shipboard systems. As 
technology quickly advances, it is necessary that the Navy’s defensive and offensive 
capabilities do as well. Discussions with those who have ultimate responsibility of these 
ships and the systems onboard will provide an invaluable viewpoint. 
In today’s age of cyber warfare, the threats that face U.S. ships are greater than in 
the past. As Captain (CAPT) (ret.) Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. has commented, “Technology is 
renowned for the way in which it changes tactics: tactical trends develop because of 
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technology, and tactical constants abide in spite of new technology.”1 It is necessary 
therefore to account for IT in creating shipboard systems and developing doctrine as 
advances are made in cyber technology. Potential threats include both hackers (e.g., 
groups like Anonymous) and nation-states. Advances in IT are beneficial to national 
security but also have the potential to leave users susceptible to intrusion. With U.S. ships 
(e.g., the littoral combat ship [LCS]), operating in coastal waters, they are increasingly 
susceptible to attack by our adversaries both physically and in the cyber domain. In 
particular, Dr. J. P. London in Proceedings Magazine cites Chinese advances in cyber, 
One significant investment is reported to be a 1,100-person cyber 
operation at Hainan Island (complete with a James Bond-style submarine 
cave), which also is home to some key Chinese military units. Canadian 
researchers have found that a number of cyber-attacks originated there; US 
Navy ships near the island have been harassed.2 
As other countries make advances in cyber, the Navy should anticipate needing to 
implement critical upgrades to network security and doctrinal adjustments more 
frequently to counter the ever-changing cyber “battle field.” Ships operating close to 
shore may be most susceptible to active cyber-attacks, while all ships would be 
susceptible to passive cyber-attacks by infected hardware or software. 
With the inherent difficulty of tracking down the source of cyber-attacks in order 
to curtail future attacks, it is imperative to be proactive and protect network 
infrastructures from potential intrusion. Unprotected shipboard networks could 
potentially give hackers or rogue nation-states access to naval weapons systems, global 
positioning systems, operational plans, etc. It is likely that events such as the selling to 
Department of Defense (DOD) of counterfeit Cisco routers3 will be attempted again in 
the future by criminal organizations or countries. Questions arise not as to whether 
                                                 
1 Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 
228. 
2 J. Landon, “Made in China,” Proceedings Magazine 137, no. 298, April 2011, accessed February 22, 
2014, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-04/made-china. 
3 Stephen Lawson and Robert McMillan, “FBI Worried as DoD Sold Counterfeit Cisco Gear: By 
Tampering with Networking Equipment, Spies Could Open up a Back Door to Sensitive Military,” 
InfoWorld, accessed February 22, 2014, http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/fbi-worried-DOD-
sold-counterfeit-cisco-gear-266.  
 3 
shipboard networks are currently impenetrable to all cyber-attacks but if they are capable 
of detecting intrusion on the network and of being reconfigured quickly to counter. 
Additionally, are current shipboard systems susceptible to real time cyber-attacks? Are all 
measures being taken to ensure that hardware and software that has been tampered with is 
being identified prior to installation to avoid future counterfeit products from making 
their way aboard ships? This thesis explores the nature of the cyber threat to U.S. 
warships through the conduct and analysis of a survey of current and recent COs. The 
potential utility of a notional defensive system is also explored. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter I has introduced the topic and the methodology for this thesis. Chapter II 
is a literature review of previous theses, scholarly writings, and books. The purpose is 
descibe the foundation for this thesis and the associated survey of COs afloat and the 
sensitivity of a naval warship to cyber-attack. Chapter III lays out how the survey was 
developed and formatted. Additionally, it looks at the potential for identifying areas of 
concern. Chapter IV analyzes the results of the 10 surveys. Finally, Chapter V 
summarizes the findings of this study as well as presents areas for future research to 
ensure protection of shipboard networks from future cyber-attacks. 
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II. RELATED RESEARCH AND WRITINGS 
A. DEFINITIONS 
Cyberspace has come to the forefront over the past decade as having vast benefits 
for both government and civilian sectors while at the same time having potential 
negatives to the security of networks. There are several definitions for cyberspace. 
Richard A. Clarke defines it as “all of the computer networks in the world and everything 
they connect and control.”4 Current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ADM Johnathan 
Greenert says, “Cyberspace will be operationalized with capabilities that span the 
electromagnetic spectrum–providing superior awareness and control when and where we 
need it.”5 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines it as “A global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of IT infrastructures 
and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer 
systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”6 
Words that arise in any discussion of cyber and the DOD that can be used to 
discuss the protection of Navy shipboard networks are defined as follows according to JP 
1-02: 
 Cyberspace Operations—The employment of cyberspace capabilities 
where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through 
cyberspace.7 
 Global Information Grid (GIG)—The globally interconnected, end-to-end 
set of information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, 
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand 
to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.8 
                                                 
4 Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 70. 
5 Johnathan Greenert, CNO’s Sailing Directions, 2011, 
http://www.navy.mil/cno/cno_sailing_direction_final-lowres.pdf, 2. 
6 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02), 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, 64. 
7 Ibid., 64. 
8 Ibid., 111. 
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 Information Assurance (IA)—Actions that protect and defend information 
systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and nonrepudiation.9 
B. POLICY AND GUIDANCE 
October 2007’s A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower points out 
“The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important enablers of joint and 
interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime 
domain, including space and cyberspace.”10 This was the vision of former CNO Admiral 
(ADM) Gary Roughead. Both the Commandant of the Marines Corps (CMC) and the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard (G-C) also recognized the importance of cyber in the 
maritime domain. By presenting it in a joint roadmap for the way ahead in the next 
century, they are ensuring it will be a consideration in all future doctrine and mission 
planning. 
ADM Roughead further amplified the importance of cyber in the 2010 Naval 
Operations Concept (NOC). “The interrelationship between sea control and power 
projection mandates that the Naval Service possess capabilities and capacity to 
concurrently shape conditions in the maritime, space and cyberspace domains, sufficient 
to accomplish the Nation’s defense strategy.”11 He sees it as a vital key to conducting 
sustained combat operations in support of the U.S. maritime security. 
The NOC also identifies one of the current challenges facing the Navy to be 
“Technologies that disrupt space and cyberspace capabilities, particularly command, 
control, communication, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems.”12 This thesis seeks to 
identify some of these potential disruptors and discuss both potential offensive and 
defensive measures that can be taken. In order to counter these threats, 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 127. 
10 U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of the Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard, Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf, 
13. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., 53. 
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Naval forces will deploy and employ redundant systems to maintain 
command and control [C2] of dispersed forces in the face of such threats, 
and will maintain proficiency in retaining the operational and tactical 
initiative when communications and information systems are degraded or 
denied.13 
Not only are reliable systems a factor, but watchstander proficiency and training are 
factors in countering potential cyber threats. 
There is a need to properly utilize current systems and employ future systems that 
can withstand or recover quickly from an intrusion by a hacker or non-friendly state 
actor. The Navy needs to have “superior warfare systems, which provide robust 
integrated air and missile defense, including ballistic missile defense; effective undersea 
warfare; and flexible network-centric attack options using organic and off-board 
weapons.”14 Shipboard and ashore computer networks that allow COs to employ 
weapons, safely navigate the maritime domain, and ensure the safety of their crews must 
be available 24 hours a day. This is specifically achieved through “Cyberspace 
Superiority, enhanced by sound IA practices, which ensures that critical networks are 
defended and full spectrum computer network operations effectively support widely 
dispersed naval forces engaged in sea control operations.”15 
Not only is cyber recognized as an asset and a threat by the CNO, but also the 
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) the Honorable Ray Mabus sees it as such. In written 
testimony in February 2010 to Congress, he stated, 
The ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps are unmatched at sea 
and over land. Our precision munitions, networked targeting systems, 
armored vehicles, stealth technology, and unmanned vehicles are 
advanced systems that define the leading edge of warfare in all domains.16 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 54. 
14 Ibid., 56. 
15 Ibid., 57. 
16 “Written Congressional Testimony of the Honorable Ray Mabus Secretary of the Navy February 24, 
2010,” 2010, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/secnav/mabus/posture_statement_2010, 15. 
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The systems employed by the Navy require cyber security to remain online and effective. 
If shipboard networks were easily penetrable, there would be little to no reliability in 
their effectiveness. It is critical to protect these systems from intrusion and to be prepared 
to counter quickly any breach. 
Cyberspace will be operationalized with capabilities that span the electromagnetic 
spectrum–providing superior awareness and control when and where we need it. In 2011, 
then CNO ADM Gary Roughead acknowledged the need for cyber superiority within the 
Navy in his CNO Guidance for 2011. He did so through two specific actions. First, he 
designated a Deputy CNO for information dominance (OPNAV N2/N6); and second, he 
established Fleet Cyber Command/Commander Tenth Fleet (FLTCYBERCOM/C10F).17 
FLTCYBERCOM reports directly to United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 
This further recognition of the importance of cyber will allow for advances in protection 
from upcoming threats both at sea and ashore. It is critical that threats be not only 
identified but also understood. These two offices will afford COs the ability to reach back 
to shore while deployed to address any threats. These threats may be immediate ones that 
they are facing at sea or may be actionable intelligence known ashore. This also builds on 
his declaration in the NOC that “We will institutionalize and mature the Information 
Dominance Corps [IDC] and build its reputation as an elite cyber force.”18 Roughead saw 
the importance of addressing current and future threats to the Fleet. 
C. PREVIOUS THESES 
Over the years, several Naval Postgraduate (NPS) theses have discussed potential 
cyber security threats and sensitivities to naval networks as well as potential approaches 
to countering them. In 2000, Lieutenant (LT) Richard J. McConnell discussed the use of 
wireless networks aboard ships. He touted the benefits of wireless as seemingly infinite. 
The idea was to implement the usage of wireless devices in order to maintain readings of 
shipboard equipment. The thesis built on the experience of the Navy’s Smart Ship 
                                                 
17 Gary Roughead, “CNO Guidance for 2011,” 2010, 
http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202011.pdf, 6. 
18 Ibid.  
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Program. The thesis’s conclusion was that future research should evaluate newer 
technologies as they become available. An area overlooked though, as cyber technologies 
continue to advance, is security and sensitivities to hacking or disruption of systems 
actively or passively by either nation-states or terrorists. It is necessary to improve 
capabilities while maintaining a secure environment. 
In 2004, Major (Maj) Dennis J. Hart developed a potential checklist for protecting 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. “A SCADA system is the 
software that controls networks such as electric power grids.”19 He acknowledged the 
sensitivity of Navy systems, particularly to potential terrorist attacks, “Al Qaeda 
computers contained information about SCADA devices and how to hack them.”20 At 
that time, the Navy relied on an internal process to ensure cyber security. Also according 
to Hart, 
DoN’s [Department of the Navy’s] CIP [Critical Infrastructure Protection] 
Program strategy is the Naval Integrated Vulnerability Assessment 
(NIVA) process. This process is used to identify and evaluate critical 
sensitivities and single points of failure by helping to protect mission 
critical cyber and physical mission essential infrastructures.21 
The Navy requires the use of shipboard and shore based systems in order to 
function. These include “Electric power and telecommunications facilities [that] make 
extensive use of SCADA systems.”22 The Navy also utilized SCADA Systems onboard 
Mine Counter Measure (MCM) ships to improve the engineering plant. This was done 
with a mix of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and ‘intelligent software.’23 
The key takeaway was that in order to protect naval assets not only does 
More work [need] to be done in encouraging commercial entities to treat 
seriously the threat posed by cyber-attacks to process control networks. 
                                                 
19 Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 34. 
20 Dennis J. Hart, “An Approach to Vulnerability Assessment for Navy Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) Systems” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 7. 
21 Ibid., 12. 
22 Ibid., 14. 
23 Ibid., 11. 
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[But] the DoN also needs to examine its own process control networks in 
order to ascertain and mitigate that threat as well.24 
In 2007, LT Rodrick A. Tester conducted research on the potential sensitivities of 
ships in port to cyber-attacks. Drawing motivation from both John Serbian’s, then 
Information Operations Issue Manager for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
statements to Congress in 2000 and Dr. Dorothy Denning’s book Information Warfare 
and Security, he established a scenario to determine the likelihood of a successful cyber-
attack against a U.S. warship.25 The author went into detail about the potential entities 
that may attack a shipboard network as well as the potential methods they could employ. 
This thesis proves a useful foundation for knowledge of potential cyber threats as it 
provides a discussion of relevant terminology. The ultimate conclusion of the thesis was 
that “The [Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM)] model showed that even 
with all security tools in place, a ship is still susceptible to attack [by viruses and worms], 
however, the risk is much less with the tools in place.”26 In order to thwart potential 
hackers, it is imperative at the least to ensure a firewall and up-to-date anti-virus program 
are installed in all shipboard networks. This take away in conjunction with doctrinal 
requirements will help deter cyber threats and minimize actual cyber-attacks. 
The covert analysis detection (CAD) system concept has been looked at by the 
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) as well as in student 
thesis work. Most recently, thesis research has been conducted on a CAD system. A 
previous NPS thesis is LT Orenthal G. Adderson and LT Kristy A. Wood’s “A 
Qualitative Analysis of Strategic Capabilities for a Covert Analysis Detection System 
Onboard an AEGIS Class Ship.” Adderson and Wood defined a CAD system as, “a 
sensor or sensor system that can covertly capture incoming and outgoing data while 
analyzing and maintaining control of the data.”27 And stated, “The use of a CAD system 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 40. 
25 Rodrick A. Tester, “Risk of Cyber Attack to Naval Ships in Port Naval Station Everett: A Model 
Based Project Utilizing SIAM” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 35. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Orenthal G. Adderson and Kristy A. Wood, “A Qualitative Analysis of Strategic Capabilities for a 
Covert Analysis Detection System Onboard an AEGIS Class Ship” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2010), 5. 
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may help to increase the overall awareness about attackers while sustaining peak levels of 
combat readiness through remaining discrete while protecting our own information 
systems.”28 This research builds upon the SIAM model as well as focusing on the risk to 
AEGIS equipped warships. In 2009, Capt Derek A. Filipe looked at the usage of energy 
change detection (ECD) on signals intelligence (SIGINT). This study looks at a 
technology that could one day be used against U.S. naval assets afloat. Technology such 
as this should be considered when discussing potential threats.29 
In March 2010, Adderson and Wood researched the benefits of incorporating a 
CAD system in conjunction with the AEGIS Weapons System (AWS) onboard Arleigh 
Burke class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and Ticonderoga class guided missile 
cruisers (CGs) given the ever-growing threat of cyber-attacks. They point out that threat 
is not a direct threat but rather indirect due to AEGIS being “bridged with other IT 
systems in order to provide critical data regarding the status of weapon systems and 
related operations.”30 This demonstrates the importance for COs and operators to be 
cognizant of the interoperability of systems across the shipboard network to ensure they 
are protected at all times. They describe the complexity of the AEGIS system, comprised 
of seven different programs: AN/SPY-1 Radar System (SPY), Command and Decision 
(C&D) System, Weapons Control System (WCS), Fire Control System (FCS), AEGIS 
Display System (ADS), Operational Readiness Test System (ORTS), and AEGIS Combat 
Training System (ACTS). The complexity of this system requires a subject matter expert 
(SME) who will be able to evaluate and understand data produced by the CAD system 
and report attacks and intrusions to the CO quickly in order to allow for an appropriate 
response as well as strengthen the protection mechanisms in place. 
The answer is not simply to install commercially available IT software and 
hardware as soon as it is released. The authors, referencing a discussion held during their 
research, state that “Warfare systems are built using faster, cheaper open architecture 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Derek A. Filipe, “Energy Change Detection to Assist in Tactical Intelligence Production” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
30 Adderson and Wood, “A Qualitative Analysis of Strategic Capabilities,” 2. 
 12 
COTS computers made from sensitive technology that can be attacked and exploited by 
many programmers and unsophisticated users.”31 This requires a combination of both 
trained operators and managers that know what threats to look for as well as reliable 
software and hardware protections in place for shipboard networks. System managers 
who are up-to-date with the latest cyber threats can keep their fellow sailors apprised of 
potential threats and of what to look for while operating their respective system. 
Historically, AEGIS, as well as other shipboard systems, has been viewed as a 
stove-piped system that operates as a stand-alone system and is not as sensitive as 
systems directly connected to a network. However, as systems are upgraded, helping to 
extend their lifecycle, they are becoming less stove-piped and as a result becoming 
potentially more sensitive to cyber-attack. “Many AEGIS components can be considered 
a stove-piped system; however, system updates are aiding it in gaining the fundamental 
characteristics of an open architecture.”32 
The inherent sensitivities of open architecture systems require COs to be informed 
of the latest, emerging threats to their shipboard systems. The CAD system as proposed 
allows COs to maintain watch on their ship’s AWS as well as options when faced with a 
cyber-attack. “In a tactical environment, a CO could choose to respond to an incident, 
isolate his/her AWS network or continue to monitor the attacker through the use of active 
deception.”33 The discussion and potential implementation of this cyber-attack 
monitoring system shows the recognition of an additional front in warfare that is 
cyberspace. A proactive approach towards cyber sensitivities by applying the CAD 
system to other shipboard systems will better prepare COs for the next generation of 
warfare in the Information Age. While the AWS is extremely critical and could prove the 
most dangerous if infiltrated by adversaries, other shipboard systems (e.g., navigation, 
communications, and engineering) could also negatively affect a ship in a combat 
situation if penetrated by an adversary. 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 44. 
32 Ibid., 46. 
33 Ibid., 50. 
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Their conclusion is that there are potential benefits in implementing a CAD 
system aboard AEGIS DDGs. According to Adderson and Wood, “Implementing a CAD 
system, with the proper training for the proper personnel, would give the CO the ability 
to focus on stealthy data capture, control and ability to conduct analysis.”34 Their 
findings also recommend assigning the communications officer (COMMO) as the one in 
charge of overseeing the CAD system, the justification is that it gives the system the 
oversight of an officer as well as someone that works directly with the affected systems. 
This would allow it to be either a collateral duty or a direct responsibility of a junior 
officer who will be able to keep the chain of command and ultimately the CO informed of 
any potential or active threats to his or her shipboard networks. This setup also 
recognizes the need to have more than one person monitoring the ship’s critical 
networked systems. It is understood that the CO is ultimately responsible for the ship and 
its crew, but it is naïve to assume or to expect that he or she would be looking solely at all 
the individual systems firsthand. The implementation of CAD-like systems in parallel to 
weapons, communications, and navigation systems is a step in the right direction to better 
protecting those systems that are potentially sensitive to cyber-attack by adversaries. 
Another thesis in March 2010 by Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Sean M. 
Andrews, entitled “Optimizing C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] Networks in the Presence of Enemy 
Jamming,” also looked at potential network sensitivities.35 His motivation was that 
“Today, the delivery of weapons by United States Navy [USN] air and surface forces is 
dependent upon critical target location information that is often provided to weapons and 
platforms by third party sensor systems forming our network.”36 This discussion 
acknowledges an inherent sensitivity of shipboard systems at the hardware level, which 
potentially leaves systems open to infiltration by adversaries. He presents a six-step kill 
chain comprised of “Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess.”37 There is the 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 75. 
35 Sean M. Andrews, “Optimizing C4ISR Networks in the Presence of Enemy Jamming” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
36 Ibid., 1. 
37 Ibid. 
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possibility that an adversary infiltrates any one of these steps and false information is sent 
back to the ship. The results could be a missed target, an unidentified target, or a faulty 
assessment. The impact of any of these is that a CO’s ability to conduct sustained combat 
operations will be degraded. This could allow an adversary to either flee the area or 
counterattack the ship. 
One potential threat he points out by referencing an article on jamming, 
Radio broadcasts or radio messages can be jammed by beaming a more 
powerful signal on the same frequency at the area in which reception is to 
be impaired, using carefully selected noise modulation to give maximum 
impairment of intelligibility of reception.38 
This type of threat is higher when ships are operating close to shore given that 
adversaries would be able to jam while hidden amongst the local infrastructure. Given 
these are the areas where newer ships (e.g., LCSs), will be deployed, it is imperative to 
discuss how better to protect shipboard networks from being jammed. This thesis 
involved modeling the effects of jamming on various steps throughout the kill chain. 
The results showed how best to strengthen the kill chain in order to lessen the 
likelihood of jamming. According to Andrews: 
By implementing electronic countermeasures, modifying node locations 
and configurations, and strengthening the communications network 
through additional links, we have been able create a network which is less 
sensitive and more robust in terms of its effectiveness against an enemy’s 
ability to attack.39 
This research reinforced the importance of utilizing countermeasures to thwart a potential 
attack in addition to implementing safeguards to improve network security. Using the 
results of this experiment and others that test the effectiveness of shipboard networks, 
COs can better prepare and defend their ships against both active and passive attacks on 
their networks, which may cripple their ability to communicate with allies or launch 
missiles when necessary. 
                                                 
38 John Markus and Paul J. DeLia, “Jamming,” AccessScience, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://accessscience.com/content/Jamming/358300. 
39 Sean M. Andrews, “Optimizing C4ISR Networks in the Presence of Enemy Jamming,” 41. 
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These aforementioned theses all touch on various aspects of cyber and its 
potential effects on how COs defend their ships during peacetime and sustained combat 
operations. It is crucial to reflect on these previous studies as the discussion progresses on 
how best to defend weapons systems and other networked systems on ships from 
infiltration by potential adversaries (i.e., both nation-states and terrorists). In order to 
build upon these previous studies and experiments, it is imperative to reach out to the 
warfighters. Consequently this research emphasizes discussion with COs about what has 
and is ‘keeping them up at night’ as far as actual and potential threats to their shipboard 
systems. This will allow future researchers opportunities to focus their efforts on what are 
seen as actual and probable threats to ships at sea. 
D. ARTICLES 
Michael Brown’s work “Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in 
Cyberspace: A Draft Concept for Navy Computer Network Operations”40 furthers the 
discussion of the Navy in cyberspace. He presents the Tomahawk cruise missile 
AN/BGM-109E as a weapon that receives both pre-flight and in-flight data from several 
sources (e.g., warships) and that depends on computer network operations in order to 
complete its mission.41 He addresses the need to maintain information superiority to 
avoid an “adversary [being] able to block or manipulate targeting, guidance, or command 
and control [C2] data to turn the TACTOM [tactical Tomahawk] against U.S. forces or 
civilian populations.”42 The threat is explained that as the U.S. advances in technology 
and security, it is only a matter of time before other governments or even terrorists are 
able to utilize the same technology and circumvent cyber security mechanisms in place. 
The Navy’s ability to secure its weapon systems from physical intrusion are understood 
and addressed aboard warships. As the cyber activity increases and becomes an arena for 
potential military action, it is critical that the Navy protects its weapons, navigational, and 
                                                 
40 Michael A. Brown, “Navy Operations to Achieve Military Power in Cyberspace: A Draft Concept 
for Navy Computer Operations,” Military Perspectives on Cyberpower, ed. Larry K. Wendt, Charles L. 
Barry, and Stuart H. Starr (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2009). 
41 Ibid., 74. 
42 Ibid., 74–75. 
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communications systems afloat. It is not a matter of if an adversary can infiltrate a ship at 
sea’s systems but rather when will they attempt a cyber-attack. 
Brown recognizes the need for commanders afloat to be able to “reach back” to 
shore and reach out to others afloat to make informed decisions (e.g., ensuring the correct 
targeting data is input into weapons systems).43 He also states that shore-based 
commanders must be able to reach out to the fleet. This back and forth ability assures that 
combatant commanders (COCOMs) are able to have real-time information and be able to 
direct attacks (e.g., missiles are directed at the right targets). Brown sums up this give-
and-take information sharing between commanders afloat and ashore with the COCOMs 
by saying, “This reciprocal access development capacity is critical for the 
synchronization of CNO (computer network operations) with theater operational plans 
and bringing CNO (computer network operations) in phase with the combatant 
commander’s battle rhythm.”44 For this reason, it is imperative that potential cyber 
threats to ships be addressed. 
The Information Age requires the Navy to look beyond physical threats and 
address those in cyberspace. As IT advances, it will be even more crucial for the Navy to 
be able to defend against cyber-attacks. Coordination between members of the IDC 
ashore and afloat will allow COs to ensure their networks and systems afloat are 
protected against potential threats. This can be done “by fusing all-source intelligence, 
network attack analysis, and known threat profiles to identify threat indicators and 
develop defense strategies to counter adversary attempts to degrade Naval operations.”45 
Current and future threats to networks require coordination to defend and protect them. 
Bringing together information gathered of potential threats allows for active 
computer network defense (CND), not just passive CND, with firewalls and antivirus 
software. The ability to defend a ship from a cyber-attack is just as critical as defending it 
from a physical attack by another ship or aircraft. The amalgamation of various computer 
                                                 




network exploitation (CNE) data available across the DOD’s GIG allows the Navy, as 
well as the other services, to operate with real time data. Brown claims, “By 
synchronizing Navy CNE, CNA (computer network attack) and CND capabilities, we 
will shift from a react/report/repair response to an active prove/predict/prepare 
defense.”46 This ‘shift’ from reactive to proactive allows for networks and weapons 
systems protection and ensures they are online and available when needed. Ensuring 
reciprocal data and threat sharing allows for further integration within strike groups and 
with other assets. 
The “Information Assurance [IA] for Network-Centric Naval Forces” presents 
findings from the CNO’s Strategic Study Group (SSG) XXVII. The Group determined 
“cybersystems to be a critical component of a future commander’s warfighting 
capability—comparable to the propulsion, weapons, and logistical systems.”47 This 
finding further emphasizes the growing role of cyber in 21st century warfighting. The 
recommendation of this group was that “commanders must be thoroughly trained and 
tested in all aspects of the information systems onboard their ships, submarines, aircraft, 
unit combat operations centers, and carriers, from both a maintenance and an operational 
perspective.”48 The need here is to incorporate IT training into the professional training 
of officers as they rise through the ranks. Potential places for it are on the job training 
(OJT) by inclusion of line items in both the combat information center watch officer 
(CICWO) and TAO personnel qualification standards (PQS). This would promote 
immediate knowledge of potential cyber threats afloat and required immediate actions by 
watch standers. Other options include at the schoolhouse level by including cyber into the 
appropriate curricula at Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, Rhode 
Island. At the Flag level, cyber training could be achieved by “taking full advantage of 
the IT program established by the DoN for senior personnel, such as the Navy Flag and 
Senior Executive Service (SES) IT programs, to address cyber defense and other IA 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 7. 
47 Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces and National Research 
Council, Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces (Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, 2010), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12609.html, 68.  
48 Ibid. 
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topics.”49 The most important inclusion of cyber in the training pipeline according to this 
study is in the training for prospective COs because “The commander must be able to 
include integration of cyberwarfare (defensive and offensive) operational strategies with 
corresponding tactics into their warfighting operations and plans.”50 It is imperative for 
COs to define their objectives for preventing and combating CNE by adversaries in their 
Guidance to their sailors. The officers involved with SSG XXVII found cyber to be of the 
same importance to combat systems, operations, and engineering due to its potential 
impacts to the safety of a ship. 
There are already a few examples of the potential dangers that can arise in 
cyberspace and affect the Navy. Richard M. Crowell’s paper “War in the Information 
Age: A Primer for Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare” cites a 2006 incident 
where a dissatisfied USN contractor attempted to plant viruses on five computers at the 
Navy’s Naples-based European Planning and Operations Command, but only two of the 
five were affected. According to Crowley, “Had the other three computers been knocked 
offline, the network that tracks U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
ships in the Mediterranean Sea and helps prevent military and commercial vessels from 
colliding would have been shut down.”51 This example highlights the need for COs not 
only to be prepared for external cyber threats, but also for the potential internal attack by 
a trusted agent. 
Center for Naval Analysis’ March 2011 document “The Navy Role in 
Confronting Irregular Challenges” discusses the need for the Navy to be able to respond 
using cyber technologies. Given the relatively new advent of cyber-attacks and expertise 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Richard M. Crowell, War in the Information Age: A Primer for Cyberspace Operations in 21st 
Century Warfare, accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514490.pdf. 
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need to maintain effective computer network defenses are important in CIC operations 
since irregular adversaries may use the internet for information dissemination and 
computer network attack.”52 
E. BOOKS 
Richard A. Clarke’s book Cyber War covers many issues associated with cyber in 
depth. He discusses the formation of cyber command (CYBERCOM). As a cautionary 
reminder, he recalled how the Navy supplemented its Smart Ship program with COTS 
(i.e., Windows NT). The result of using proprietary software was that the shipboard 
personnel did not have access to the code to fix errors. The result was that whenever the 
system crashed the ship became a floating office building. Without a backup or redundant 
system, everything came to a standstill from the bridge to the engineering plant.53 This 
example highlights the need to look thoroughly at all available options to protecting and 
operating shipboard networks. COTS systems have benefits but these must be weighed 
against potential risks as well as sensitivities that may allow outsiders access to naval 
networks. 
F. SUMMARY 
The preceding theses, policies, articles, and books have shown areas for growing 
concern due to the exponential growth of and reliance on cyber over the past decade. 
Areas for improvement for the Navy include short-term fixes and long-term 
implementations. There needs to be a balance between COTS and proprietary Navy or 
DOD hardware and software aboard U.S. Navy ships. Advances are necessary to protect 
shipboard networks from cyber intrusion and attacks by a range of adversaries from the 
disgruntled IT professional to unfriendly state actors. Modeling potential attacks using 
DOD and other governmental cyber methods in parallel will allow proactive software and 
hardware designs as well as doctrinal changes. 
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III. SURVEY DESIGN AND PURPOSE 
A survey was designed to gather data from current and former COs afloat 
regarding the need (or lack thereof) for an active defense system (e.g., the CAD system) 
to protect shipboard networks from possible cyber-attacks and increase the tactical 
flexibility of the CO. As hacking methods evolve, it is likely that nation-states and 
terrorists will attempt to interfere with or take control of shipboard systems remotely. 
While there has been some research on potential cyber deterrence methods to protect 
ships-at-sea, there has not yet been specific steps taken to provide COs afloat with active 
shipboard measures for their deployment. 
Building upon previous research, the next logical step in exploring the potential 
utility of the CAD system was determined to be surveying current and former COs afloat. 
This would allow the discussion to include those afloat who would potentially benefit the 
most from the technology. 
A 26-question survey was created (Appendix A) and revised (Appendix B) to 
explore a CO at sea’s understanding of cyber threats on their ship and crew better. In 
order to keep the survey objective, the participants were selected at random on a 
voluntary basis. No personally identifying information (PII) was collected. The survey’s 
intent, like this research, was focused on the perceived need for the CAD system or a 
similar system and was not about the COs’ themselves. 
This survey was designed to be administered to those that have served, as COs 
afloat in the U.S. Navy at any rank from lieutenant (LT) through captain (CAPT). The 
reason for not including the ranks of ensign (ENS), lieutenant junior-grade (LTJG), rear 
admiral—lower half (RDML), rear admiral—upper half (RADM), vice admiral (VADM), 
and ADM is that there are currently no command-at-sea opportunities at these ranks. 
Narrowing this initial survey creates a baseline from which to relate future surveys of flag 
officers, junior officers, warrant officers, and enlisted service members. The main target 
of the survey was SWOs. 
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The first section asked for ‘General Information.’ This included rank (at the time 
of command afloat), ship type, experience in Weapons Department or Combat Systems 
Department, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable platform or not, and number of at-
sea commands. This section of questions helped to formulate the demographics and better 
understand the responses. The ranks ranged from LT to CAPT. The reason for the range 
of ranks is due to patrol craft (PC) captains being LTs and CG captains being CAPTs. 
This allowed for a wide swath of experience to feed into the survey. 
Command-at-sea means the individual has ultimate responsibility for the safety of 
the ship and its crew. This experience is unparalleled at any other level of responsibility, 
“(a)s a result of this sort of sweeping power within the … Navy, some refer to command 
of a … U.S. naval warships as the ‘last great monarchy in the world.’”54 This audience 
should have the keenest insight into which systems are most sensitive and if 
compromised by cyber warfare techniques would have a negative impact on national 
security. Their experiences of command including deployments and training exercises 
(e.g., Composite Training Unit Exercise [COMPTUEX] and Joint Task Force Exercise 
[JTFEX], will provide insight to shipboard systems). During both real world and 
simulated scenarios, COs afloat are faced with degradations of various systems. These 
experiences allow them to speak to which systems are most sensitive to attack as well as 
to which are mission critical. 
This initial survey was not distributed to junior officers at the department head 
(DH) or division officer (DIVO) level. This was because while they have a general 
knowledge based on their various qualifications (e.g., officer of the deck [OOD], SWO, 
engineering officer of the watch [EOOW], and TAO); their in-depth knowledge is usually 
limited to their respective department or division. Further studies should look to these 
two audiences, (i.e., DHs and DIVOs) for further insight into specific systems deemed 
sensitive to cyber-attacks. An example would be that if the Tomahawk Weapons System 
(TWS) is determined to be susceptible to attack, weapons officers (WEPS) and strike 
officers should be surveyed to determine specific weaknesses and potential remedies. 
                                                 
54 Glenn Sulmasy, The National Security Court System: A Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age of 
Terror (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17. 
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Flag officers were not specifically included in this initial survey because their 
perspectives, as demanded by their positions, are different from those of COs afloat. 
Their being away from command-at-sea to fill other positions (e.g., Strike group 
commander or any of a variety of administrative billets) may date their opinion of what 
systems are most sensitive. Reasons for this may be advances in technology to protect 
systems or in systems being replaced. Further studies should address strike group 
commanders to determine what they have seen during deployments and various exercises. 
In addition, regional commanders can speak to regional threats to systems that may need 
addressed (e.g., Pacific Command [PACOM]). 
Ship types included aircraft carriers (CVN), amphibious ships, CG, DDG, frigate 
(FFG), MCM, patrol coastal ships (PC), LCS, and other. The goal for this question is to 
consider all potential surface commands-at-sea. 
Asking whether the individual had experience in weapons or combat systems 
departments helped determine if they had firsthand knowledge or experience with 
weapon systems (e.g., AWS found on CGs and DDGs). The reason for this interest is 
because while navigation and engineering systems if compromised will bring potential 
immediate damage to the ship itself and potentially those in the immediate vicinity, a 
compromised missile system may result in the inadvertent launching of weapons. This 
could be as severe as the launching of missiles at land-based facilities of another nation 
or even the U.S. The potential for irreparable damage to another nation’s infrastructure or 
relationship with the U.S. makes the sensitivity of weapons systems to cyber-attack of 
particular interest. 
The majority of COs afloat should have experience with other potentially critical 
systems that may be interfered with by unfriendly nations or terrorists. Navigation 
systems are learned in depth while qualifying for OOD and this knowledge is further 
refined by standing the watch and assisting other officers in their learning of the system. 
Shipboard engineering systems are also learned through various training requirements, in 
order to qualify as a SWO a requirement is a basic PQS on the ship’s engineering plant. 
Additionally, a career wicket that must be met is an EOOW qualification. This 
qualification requires an individual be able to respond to any potential engineering 
 24 
casualty quickly. In addition, in port watches such OOD and command duty officer 
(CDO) require knowledge of the engineering systems in the event of a casualty or 
emergency because the majority of the crew is not onboard after hours. It is understood 
that by the time of command-at-sea, an individual has a certain level of engineering, 
navigation, and communications knowledge. 
The number of at-sea commands held by an individual highlights their overall 
knowledge of what it takes to maintain the safety of the ship and its crew while 
underway. A person with zero at-sea commands may be able to speak to potential cyber 
threats based on readings, second-hand knowledge from discussions, or from their tours 
at-sea as the executive officer (XO), a DH, or a DIVO. This is not to say their 
experiences and insights are not valuable, rather for this initial development of a baseline, 
differentiation is helpful since the target audience is those with command at-sea 
experience. At the opposite end is “four or more” this is because these numbers would be 
outside of the normal career path. The average is two (i.e., command and major 
command). Three is possible in the case where a CO is relieved and a CDR or CAPT is 
taken from staff duty to replace him or her for some period until the relieved CO’s relief 
reports aboard. The knowledge and insight may vary amongst COs afloat based on their 
number of at-sea commands and in order to see if this is the case, this question is asked. 
A series of follow-on questions to the number of commands seeks to determine 
further, how the experience and environment of command determines what is seen as a 
critical system. The questions look at the number of and type of deployments, homeport, 
areas of operation, and was it a precomissioning unit (PCU)/active unit/decommissioning 
unit. All these factors may shape what is seen as the most sensitive system, what the 
potential threats to the systems are, and potential ways to address them. An example 
would be the CO who was in command during the building of the ship might have a 
different insight into sensitivities then the CO who is decommissioning a vessel. 
Consequently, a CO deployed to the 7th Fleet may perceive different threats than a CO 
who only deployed to the 2nd Fleet. 
The next section of the survey sought to determine what is seen as a critical 
system that has potential sensitivities to a cyber-attack. The major systems of concern 
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include Combat Systems, Communications, Engineering, Navigation, and Weapons. 
“Other” has been included in the event that the individual considers another system more 
sensitive than those listed do. This will help ensure no system is overlooked. The way 
ahead will be established by addressing the system that is seen as the most sensitive 
overall. It is imperative to address the most sensitive systems first rather than attempting 
to secure funding for all systems. 
Further determination of sensitive systems requires differentiating between 
systems that may not be seen as sensitive and those that are. This question is posed the 
same as the previous, also with the “Other” option to ensure any overlooked systems 
have an opportunity to be called out and addressed. 
Communications systems are critical to the day-to-day mission of the ship. These 
systems include messaging systems that are of three possible types unclassified 
(UNCLAS) or non-secure internet protocol router (NIPR), secret (S) or secure internet 
protocol router (SIPR), and top secret (TS) for joint worldwide intelligence 
communications system (JWICS). All of these systems allow ships to communicate 
between each other, aircraft, satellites, and shore facilities. The sensitivity here is that 
adversaries or cyber terrorists could intercept, monitor, and/or alter communications to 
and from a ship. The harm in this could be as minimal as email SPAM or as major as 
altered orders. 
Navigation systems are critical for the safe maneuvering of all deployed ships. All 
ships have charts but also rely on navigational systems (e.g., Furuno radar). An industry 
standard, it may have the potential to be intercepted and altered by well-informed hackers 
in the future. An unencrypted, COTS geospatial positioning system (GPS) is a potential 
liability in ensuring a ship remains on course. If an adversary could harness the 
technology to manipulate the data, a CO and his/her ship could head off course and be 
out of range of a supply ship or a port to resupply. In the event that a navigational system 
is manipulated, ships may be unable to avoid submerged obstructions (e.g., underwater 
mountains or sunken vessels). Navigation systems are critical to the safety of the ship and 
crew; if they become compromised, there is the potential for error resulting in either 
grounding or veering off course. 
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Engineering systems are also critical to all of the hotel services aboard, (e.g., 
water and electricity) in addition to allowing a ship to sail. In a time when readings are 
taken by watchstanders digitally, systems have potentially increased sensitivity to cyber 
intrusion. If readings can be manipulated, propulsion and engine systems may overheat or 
run out of oil, causing systems to degrade or to at worst become irreparably damaged. 
This would cause the ship to be a “sitting duck” susceptible to physical attack. 
Attacks on the hotel services and reliance on local port operations and their 
services would force a ship to return to port to repair the systems or receive almost daily 
underway replenishments (UNREPs) of food and water. Ships must be replenished at sea 
or pull into the nearest port before they deplete their fuel onboard. While most sailors 
could survive a few days without showering or clean clothes and food can be served on 
paper plates, water is necessary to chill vital computer systems. Having hotel systems 
inoperable would limit a ship’s time between replenishments or pulling into port. 
Limiting a ship’s ability to operate independently would give potential adversaries an 
advantage. For these reasons it is important consider the potential sensitivity of 
engineering systems to attack. 
“Other” systems could include any of those not covered by the previous 
discussion. COs afloat that have had ships equipped with weather systems may feel them 
to be the most important. A degraded weather system may cause a ship to steer into 
heavy seas. An adversary could potentially influence an entire carrier strike group (CSG) 
to sail into rough weather leaving them sensitive to attack and limiting their ability to 
conduct sustained flight operations. Another sensitive area could be those systems used in 
flight operations. The manipulation of these may leave a helicopter detachment or entire 
airwing grounded. These are two examples of possible “other” systems that may be seen 
as sensitive to COs. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
In-depth data was gathered from surveys of current and past COs in conjunction 
with existing data from previous studies. Those polled included officers that held 
command at LT—two, LCDR—three, CDR—eight, and CAPT—three (see Table 1). The 
platforms represented by this group included MCM—one, PC—one, FFG—seven, 
DDG—three, and CG—two (see Table 2). This allowed for insight beyond the cruiser 
and destroyer (CRUDES) community. With the background of those surveyed including 
various platform experiences, experiences on these platforms as CO were collated with 
their experiences on other platforms in capacities other than COs. This was highlighted in 
later questions where responders discussed both LCSs and CVNs. There was a lack of 
amphibious experience, so this work may not prove applicable to the transportation of 
Marines to various areas of operations (AORs) as well as their C4I construct while en 
route. 
 
LT LCDR CDR CAPT 
XX XXX XXXXXXXX XXX 
Table 1.   Rank at time(s) of command afloat. 
MCM PC FFG DDG CG 
X X XXXXXXX XXX XX 
Table 2.   Platform commanded afloat. 
Seven of those surveyed had served in the WEPS or combat systems officer 
(CSO) role prior to command; this allowed an appreciation of the Navy’s weapons and 
communications suites, as well as potential sensitivities to these. None of the participants 
had BMD experience; this may have provided insight into a growing area with the 
forward deployment of four BMD-capable DDGs to 6th Fleet. The majority of those who 
responded had only one command-at-sea tour (see Table 3). 
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One Two Three Four or More 
XXXXXX XX X X 
Table 3.   Number of At Sea Commands. 
The next section of questions focused on ship-specific concerns (i.e., a 
comparison of the various platforms to see if one was seen as more susceptible to cyber-
attack than the others were). First, they were asked to rank a ship’s sensitivity to cyber 
related attacks with 1 being least sensitive and 5 being most sensitive (see Table 4). Then 
in order to clarify their reasoning, they were asked which platform was most sensitive 
and which platform was least sensitive. Three responses were that all Navy ships are 
equally sensitive, CG/DDG/FFG/LCS each received two votes for most sensitive, and 
CVN received one vote. 
 
 1 (least) 2 3 4 5 (most) 
CVN    X X 
Amphib  X XX XX XX 
CG   X XXXXX XXXX 
DDG   XXX XXX XXX 
FFG X XX X X XXXX 
LCS X X X  XX 
MCM  X X  X 
PC   X  XX 
Table 4.   Ships ranked by sensitivity to cyber related attacks. 
For least sensitive, four responses stated that all Navy ships were sensitive to an 
extent. Five responses focused on the smaller platforms (i.e., FFGs/LCSs/MCMs/PCs). In 
addition, one respondent felt CVNs were the least sensitive. For FFGs, their limited use 
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due to pending decommissioning makes the employment of a program like the CAD 
system unlikely to be worth the cost. Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training 
(CARAT) missions are their main tasking. These are usually UNCLAS in nature and use 
limited weapons systems making it unlikely that an adversary may gain anything. LCSs 
are relatively new and have yet to be incorporated into the CSG framework. They 
therefore do not currently appear to pose any benefit to the enemy if compromised. 
MCMs and PCs also are not incorporated in the CSG framework, and do not currently 
have a critical role in the C4I network of a CSG. Asked to rank these four small ship 
types against CVNs, amphibious ships, CGs, and DDGs, one can see why they ranked so 
low. The outlier was the respondent that felt CVNs were the least sensitive. This may be 
seen as their lack of weapons and combat systems; however, it would not account for the 
attached carrier air wing (CAW). 
The next section was on cyber threats. The purpose here was to gauge whether the 
individual sees cyber as a potential weapon to be used by an adversary (see Table 5), 
seven viewed it as a threat. Of the three that did not, two were retired post major 
command (i.e., prior to the advent of cyber being a critical part of the Navy’s C4I 
construct). The remaining one was in command of an MCM at the time of the survey, and 
did feel that their ship would be a potential target due to its limited assets and specific 
mission. With those three exceptions, the remaining seven viewed it as an actual threat to 
the CG/DDG/FFG they were in command of. This essentially validates the need to 
address concerns of COs at sea in order to protect potentially sensitive assets. 
 Yes No 
Is cyber terrorism a 
threat? 
XXXXXXX XXX 
Table 5.   Cyber terrorism, currently a threat or not to ships. 
Next, the respondents were asked to highlight when they felt a ship would be 
most and least sensitive to a cyber-attack (see Table 6). Half responded that a ship is 
always sensitive, three said while in homeport, and two said when deployed. The 
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majority viewing it as a threat always again highlights the need to address concerns of 
those COs in command. Those viewing homeport could be due to the network being 
established and potentially infiltrated over time. The two claiming on deployment may be 
due to potential threats while using wireless fidelity (WIFI) or internet connections in 
foreign ports. Alternatively, they may have been alluding to the adversary being able to 
reach out to our networks by other means while deployed (e.g., previously compromised 
hardware or software). 
For the time when a ship would be least sensitive to a cyber-threat (see Table 6), 
five saw this as an unlikely scenario as long as systems were powered on and connected. 
Two felt during fleet level exercises, two felt during deployments, and one in homeport. 
The reasoning provided for it being during exercises (e.g., Independent Deployer 
Certification Exercise [IDCERTEX] or COMPTUEX) is that ships would be expecting to 
be attacked by opposing forces. They would therefore be extra vigilant in their defense of 
shipboard networks. If a non-exercise player attempted to gain access, there would be a 
higher likelihood of that action being exposed. Those two responding while on 
deployment, raised the point that, at least currently, it is difficult to compromise a unit at 
sea given they are not hardwired to a network. In addition, the lone respondent that stated 
while in homeport may have felt that a ship tied up to a pier would not be appealing to a 
cyber-terrorist. 
Table 6.   Periods of sensitivity to cyber-attacks. 
WIFI is a part of everyday life and can be used to make individuals more mobile 
in terms of shipboard work. The crew uses wireless technology aboard ships to share 
movies, games, etc. While this technology is not connected to shipboard networks or to 
 Always Homeport Exercises Deployment Never 
Most 
Vulnerable 
XXXXX XXX - XX - 
Least 
Vulnerable 
- X XX XX XXXXX 
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off ship internet protocol (IP) services, it may in the future. The respondents were five 
for, four against, and one not applicable (N/A) as to whether ships should be able to use 
WIFI while in port (see Table 7). Benefits would include increased morale for crews as 
well as the ability for technicians to troubleshoot on scene while coordinating with 
distance support. Over the course of a year, the time spent tethered to a desktop or laptop 
connected to the network adds up. With technology available to allow sailors to be 
connected while walking throughout a ship or while working in a space, it should not be 
discounted due to potential cyber threats. Rather it should be a guarded network that 
allows sailors to increase productivity. 
 For Against N/A 
WIFI In Port XXXXX XXXX X 
Table 7.   Position on WIFI for ships in port. 
The next section dealt with cyber protection and implementation necessity (see 
Table 8). The point of this section was to have those surveyed draw upon past and current 
experiences in determining when a program like the CAD system should be installed. 
When the Navy implements a new system, there are several different ways of rolling it 
out to the fleet. They could do it by ship type (e.g., Remote Mine Submersible [RMS] 
was installed on Flight IIA DDGs). Another method would be to do so based on 
Numbered Fleet (e.g., a specific Fleet’s ships could get a modification to a system based 
on a perceived threat in that region). Prior to deployment, ships have continuous 
maintenance availabilities (CMAVs). During this time, ships could be outfitted with a 
new system to take forward into theater. Another two options may include either during 
initial construction or during mid-life upgrade. 
The majority of respondents, eight out of 10, leaned towards a system to help 
combat cyber threats (e.g., the CAD system) being installed during the initial 
construction. If the technology is available and approved for shipboard use that would 
allow a CO at sea to better defend their ship, it should be made available during initial 
construction. This allows a crew to be accustomed to working with a system rather than 
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the alternative of being unprotected and having to learn a new system later in the ship’s 
life. 
The second most favored approach was during the mid-life upgrade of the ship. 
During this period, multiple systems of a ship are removed, replaced, or upgrade. It 
would allow new technologies not available at initial construction to be incorporated into 
the C4I structure of defending a ship. This allows technology to be installed that will 
counter threats that were not present 15, 20, even 25 years prior. 
The majority did not view the other three options (pre-deployment, by numbered 
Fleet, and by ship type) as preferred options. Reasons for this are addressed earlier in the 
survey where the majority saw cyber threats as real and could affect all navy ships. If the 
enemy can reach a Seventh Fleet asset, they could just as easily infiltrate a Third Fleet 
asset. For a platform specific approach, those surveyed favored addressing CRUDES 
platforms, but the responses to this question highlight the desire to install technology 
across all platforms. Finally, pre-deployment seemed to either be too late and to be an 
added hurdle prior to deployment. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
By Ship Type XX - XXXX - XX 
By Numbered Fleet - XX XXX XX X 
Pre-Deployment X X XX XXXX X 
Mid-life Upgrade - X XXX XX XXX 
Initial Construction X - - - XXXXXXXX 
Table 8.   How/when to implement a cyber-protection system on a 
ship. 
The next section addressed fiscal concerns given the increased need to be fiscally 
responsible in recent years (see Table 9). The survey asked participants to rank the areas 
where cyber could be addressed: offensive, training, maintenance, defensive, guidance, 
and other. These five areas along with others allow for a discussion on determining what 
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source of funding may best be used to protect ships against cyber. Offensive measures 
would be employing technology that would protect against cyber-attacks. Training 
encompasses such means as General Military Training (GMT), lessons on Navy 
Knowledge Online (NKO), or at schoolhouses across the Fleet. Maintenance would be 
used to improve the current cyber protection infrastructure (e.g., protecting existing 
shipboard networks by upgrading hardware and software). Defensive would be to install 
cyber protection systems or processes (e.g., the CAD system). Guidance includes cyber 
implementation and protection policy. Other was provided for the respondents in the 
event they thought of another way to address the issue through funding. 
The two means receiving the lowest support were offensive measures and 
guidance. The latter of these two may have seemed as taking too long or being ineffective 
in the end. With cyber threats, it is critical to address them as they arise rather than 
attempt cultural or institutional change, which tends to take months or years to spread 
across an organization. Investing limited funds and resources on rhetoric would leave 
shipboard networks sensitive for the short-term and potentially longer. 
Cyber training received feedback that is more positive. Instituting training (e.g., 
the annual IA training mandatory for all personnel using Navy networks) ensures a 
baseline level of knowledge throughout the Fleet. Required training for seaman recruits 
through ADMs has the potential to, at a minimum; make all sailors aware of the threats 
facing all ships and naval assets. This approach addresses awareness and ways to use 
systems more securely. However, it does not address an adversaries’ ability to access 
shipboard networks. 
The approach receiving the second most consideration was maintenance. This 
would address existing flaws and weaknesses in current shipboard networks. Rather than 
replacing everything and starting over, those surveyed find shoring up existing cyber 
infrastructure as a viable option. This could include repairing cabling, switches, routers, 
etc. Another important avenue is to ensure that antivirus software is up-to-date on all 
networks (NIPR, SIPR, JWICS, etc.). Existing shipboard networks should be maintained 
at their highest state of readiness due to the Navy’s increased reliance on such venues as 
chat for keeping Fleet Commanders apprised of the disposition of their forces afloat. If a 
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unit is independently deployed and their shipboard network is compromised, they may be 
unable to maintain communications with the local sea combat commander. 
The overwhelming response was for a defensive approach to protecting shipboard 
networks (e.g., the CAD system). The installation of a new system to protect a ship better 
appears to be the favored approach for many reasons. One would be due to the time in 
which it can be accomplished. A phased approach to installation could be completed 
utilizing CMAV or specialized-repair activity (SRA). 
 
 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 
(highest) 
Offensive XX XX XXXX X X 
Training X X X XX XXXX 
Maintenance - X XX XX XXXXX 
Defensive - - XX XX XXXXXX 
Guidance X XXXXXX X XX X 
Other: Homefront 
Hacking 
- - - - X* 
Table 9.   Prioritization of means of cyber protection given focus on 
fiscal constraint.  
The next section of the survey attempted to determine if any particular department 
on a ship was more or less sensitive to cyber intrusions (see Table 10). In an attempt to 
identify a department or departments, respondents ranked combat systems, operations, 
engineering, administrative, weapons, and other from least sensitive to most sensitive to 
such a threat. ‘Other’ allowed for a department that may have been overlooked to be 
identified. 
Half of the respondents viewed the Combat Systems Department (and its 
Communications Division) and Operations as the most sensitive. This seems to be the 
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most logical due to the importance of a ship at sea being able to not only communicate 
with higher headquarters but also being able to utilize its combat systems suite to defend 
itself. Communication is critical within CSGs, amphibious readiness groups, and surface 
action groups. This illuminates an area of concern in regard to a need for 
improved/maintained cyber protection. 
As far as least sensitive, half of respondents saw Engineering Department as the 
least sensitive to cyber terrorists. One of the reasons behind this may be the fact that the 
majority of Engineering Department’s systems are standalone and confined to the ship 
and do not require access to a penetrable ship to ship or ship to shore interface. The 
exceptions would be reports that are sent off ship about fuel amounts or maintenance 
concerns. The remaining respondents were split between Weapons, Supply, and Admin 
Departments. 
 
 1 (least) 2 3 4 5 (most) 
Combat 
Systems 
X - XX XX XXXXX 
Operations - X - XXX XXXXX 
Engineering XXX - XX XXX X 
Administrative XXX XX - XX XX 
Weapons X XX XX XX XX 
Other: Supply - - - - X 
Table 10.   Departments’ sensitivity to cyber-attack. 
In an effort to find if there was a common person in charge across the Fleet, 
respondents were asked who is currently in charge of cyber threats. Three respondents 
have seen it be a chief petty officer, two have seen it be a DH, one each had seen it be a 
DIVO, an IT1, C10F, unsure, and in once instance a combination of CO and another 
officer. This highlights a varied approach across commands, and the potential for a single 
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position being identified for commonality fleet wide. To see the level of importance 
placed on this area they were asked how these individuals were appointed: as either their 
primary duty, collateral duty, or another means. Six had seen it be the collateral duty and 
three had seen it be the primary duty. The trend of it being a collateral duty rather than a 
primary duty 
The next follow on questions asked which department should be in charge of 
cyber (see Table 11) and whether or not they should have a counterpart on staff. Four saw 
this falling under combat systems purview, three saw it as an operations area, and one felt 
communications as a department should oversee it, one felt either combat systems or 
operations, and one was undecided. The majority see it as a Combat Systems Department 
area of responsibility, particularly Communications Division, also known as CC (Combat 
Systems-Communication) Division others seeing it as an operations department area 
could be given the potential for Communications Division to be a part of Operations 
Department as OC (Operations-Communication) Division. All but one respondent saw 
the need for a counterpart on staff that could address concerns of a ship as well as 





Operations Communications Undecided 
Cyber 
Division 
XXXXX XXXX X X 
Table 11.   Department that a Cyber Division should report to. 
In order to see what level of training may be needed to prepare unrestricted line 
(URL) officers for command, they were asked at what level it should be given (see Table 
12). The options were DIVO training, currently Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC), 
DH school, or during the XO/CO pipeline. The majority of respondents fell that it was 
necessary to have training at every level. In one instance, it was not seen as necessary for 
DHs, and another instance seen as not necessary for DIVOs. Two surveyed felt it was 
enough to have it at the DIVO level. The majority highlights COs afloat seeing a need for 
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cyber training at all levels. The one reply that did not list DH may be given the amount of 
information currently covered at SWOS in six months for an individual prior to two 18-
month tours that may or may not involve direct interaction with Combat Systems 
Department or communications division. However, when reflected in Table 12 there is a 
clear trend for a cyber-threats and cyber protections to be taught at all levels to URL 
officers. 
 
 BDOC DH XO/CO 
Training 
Pipeline 
XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX 
Table 12.   Preferred training pipeline to teach cyber. 
Finally, the last question involved the ranking of methods to prepare sailors for 
dealing with cyber threats (see Table 13). The categories were all-hands training, early 
warning detection systems, outsourcing systems and maintenance, schooling for 
operators, the use of COTS systems, the CAD system, simulators, or some other method. 
The overwhelming number of respondents favored schooling for operators. This would 
allow a CO to have Sailors trained to detect and defend against cyber threats. The next 
most favored approach was the CAD system. The least favored approach would be to 
outsource systems and their maintenance. This was expected due to the potential for 
compromise of critical systems. One respondent replied data visualization. 
 
 1 (least) 2 3 4 5 
(most) 
All Hands Training XXX - XX - XXXX 
Early Warning System - X XXX X XXX 
Outsourcing XXX XXXX X - - 
Schools - - XX XXX XXXX 
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 1 (least) 2 3 4 5 
(most) 
COTS - XX X XXX X 
CADS - - XX XXXX XX 
Simulators X X XXX XX X 
Other: Data Visualization - - - - X 
Table 13.   Preferred methods for preparing sailors for cyber threats. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The data provides relatively clear indication regarding the following issues as 
perceived by the COs polled. First, cyber-threats are real and pose a real threat to naval 
warships afloat. Current and former COs see cyber-threats as a current concern not a 
problem still 10-15 years out. Second, combat systems departments onboard ships are at 
the greatest risk for cyber intrusion due to overseeing all communications on and off ship. 
Radio transmissions are required to able to travel from higher headquarters to the warship 
that is forward deployed. If these transmissions are delayed or intercepted, a CO may 
never receive the reinforcement they require or may not reach the battle they were headed 
to participate in. Third, the CAD system appears to be seen as viable the COs surveyed as 
cyber self-defense mechanism. 
There is some indication that some COs see operations department as similarly if 
not more vulnerable to cyber intrusion than combat systems department. Some COs are 
still unsure of how best to provide WIFI to sailors in port without jeopardizing their 
shipboard networks. This may be due to a concern for electronic spillage to occur 
between secure and unsecure networks. While some saw all ships as vulnerable, the 
CRUDES ships were the ones focused on in particular. FFGs was seen as not being as 
susceptible to cyber-attack potentially due to their upcoming fleet wide 
decommissioning. Additionally, there was somewhat of lack of agreeance on who 
onboard a ship should oversee cyber related issues. Experiences ranged from seeing a 
first class petty officer all the way through the CO. 
The results of the surveys gave little indication of a current system or training 
mechanism in place that protects ships from sophisticated cyber-attacks. Those surveyed 
answered based on their experiences; there concerns are those of the warfighter and not 
the information professional in charge of improving cyber vulnerabilities. However, this 
did give a prospective that will allow further research to look at other avenues for 
defending a ship at sea.  
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Future research should look at the naval processes from a larger scale (e.g., supply 
routes to sailors on deployment). As one respondent stated, “We must look holistically at 
the threat and the systems. I can degrade mission success in multiple ways; we seldom 
look at vectors of attack in a holistic way.”55 There are multiple ways to look at cyber 
weaknesses of ships at sea. This survey gathered insight from those who have 
commanded at sea. There is information to be gathered from the DHs, DIVOs, chiefs, and 
junior sailors that are more technologically advanced that could add to the ongoing 
discussion. The protection of ships by the CAD system or something similar has merit, 
and it seems to be inevitable in the further defense our ships and crews that are deployed. 
                                                 
55 Respondent D, CG CO. 
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